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Recently, it has been stated that single-world interpretations of quantum theory are logically in-
consistent . The claim is derived from contradicting statements of agents in a setup combining two
Wigner’s-friend experiments. Those statements stem from applying the measurement-update rule
subjectively, i.e., only for the respective agent’s own measurement. We argue that the contradiction
expresses the incompatibility of collapse and unitarity — resulting in different formal descriptions
of a measurement — and does not allow to dismiss any specific interpretation of quantum theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
The mathematical formalism of quantum theory has been
celebrated for its success; it has been well-tested and, so
far, not been falsified [1] — even in cases where its pre-
dictions are counter-intuitive and paradoxical [2–6]. Nev-
ertheless, there are ongoing controversies: On the one
hand, there are various attempts to resolve the conflict
of the apparent collapse during a measurement with the
unitarity evolution. On the other hand, controversial dis-
cussions are led on how to understand and to interpret
the formalisms.
The authors of [7] claim to have proven that single-
world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-
consistent. They consider a combination of twoWigner’s-
friend gedankenexperiments and derive a contradiction
regarding the statements of the agents involved. The con-
tradiction is, actually, a result of the quantum-mechanical
description of the measurement: The agents in the setup
attribute a collapse [8] merely to their own measurement.
We subsequently refer to this as subjective collapse. It
is, however, subjective only in the case of encapsulated
observers where unitarity and collapse are conflicting,
see III and IV. Agents measuring the same quantum
system — not each other’s memories — can objectively
agree on a collapse occurring in every measurement.
In our opinion, the subjective-collapse model, as Ev-
erett’s relative-state model [9], or other collapse mod-
els such as GRW [10], is a mathematical formalism and
not an interpretation. All the above formalisms yield
the same predictions on experiments until one considers
encapsulated observers; and then — if ever possible —
a Wigner’s-friend experiment will have to decide among
them.
In [7], the authors introduce a framework of so-called sto-
ries and plots that captures “what could be said” — in
particular about entities in a physical experiment; the
contradiction in question is obtained in this framework.
We argue that the use of the framework to rule out cer-
tain interpretations of quantum theory as done in [7] is
debatable. This doubt has been supported recently [11]
by a consistent description of the setup in terms of a
generalised version of Bohmian mechanics.
We first discuss the story-plot framework and hope to
clarify how it relates to classical information. We crit-
ically examine the notion of “many worlds” established
in the framework. Furthermore, we examine the original
S M s ∈ {0, 1}
|φ〉
FIG. 1. A source S emits a 2-dimensional quantum state |φ〉
that is measured (in M) to yield some binary result s.
Wigner’s-friend experiment and formulate a contradic-
tion analogous to that in [7] in terms of stories and plots.
Said contradiction, therefore, can be seen to reflect the
measurement problem. Finally, we consider the setup
in [7] and explicitly show how the contradiction arises
from the subjective collapse.
II. THE STORY-PLOT FRAMEWORK
The framework addresses the question what can possi-
bly be said about a physical experiment. A simple ex-
ample from quantum physics is the Stern-Gerlach setup,
depicted in Fig 1. After recapitulating the framework
in IIA, we discuss in II B how the compatibility con-
straint in [7] relates to interoperability — the ability to
copy information — and how their definition of “many
worlds” is in conflict with the definiteness of measure-
ment results. The latter relates to the distinguishability
of the information obtained by the measurement. Finally,
in II C, we argue that the set of possible stories about a
quantum-mechanical experiment can be formally repre-
sented by joint, conditional probability distributions.
A. Events, Stories, and Plots
In [7], a story s is defined as “an account of events that
occur.” Neither of the terms “event,” “occur,” and “real”
is unambiguous in this context, in particular if there is
no further specification of the theoretical foundation. We
will generalize the concept slightly and take a story to be
a priori “anything that can be stated” [12]. Statements
(or accounts or stories) can be encoded in a finite bit
string. These bit strings carry classical information that
is preserved when copied — we will term this feature
interoperability — and is based on a notion of distin-
guishability, i.e., different stories can be told apart from
one another. Thus, stories are entities of classical in-
formation, even though we might talk about quantum
2systems.
A possible story is for instance
“The source emits a photon in the state |φ〉 =
α|0〉 + β|1〉 which is measured in the basis
{|0〉, |1〉} and yields the outcome 0.”
Another example is
“If a source emits a photon in the state
|φ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉, a measurement in the ba-
sis {|0〉, |1〉} might yield the outcome 0 or the
outcome 1.”
While the first has a factual character, the second ac-
counts for different possible outcomes. Both are elements
in the set of all possible stories, Σ. If the setting of the
story (e.g., the experimental setup) is known, and the
content has enough structure, by interoperability, one can
represent it more concisely with a set of ordered tuples of
parameters — each tuple capturing one of the instances
of information. From now on we assume — as in [7] —
that stories have some temporal structure. Thus, the first
parameter in the tuple is a time index from a discrete or-
dered set T allowing for a notion of before and after. All
other information is stored in a tuple x ∈ V provided it
can be matched with the representation. As the story is
finite, it can represent, for instance, real numbers only up
to some finite precision. One might nonetheless take the
values of the parameters embedded in a continuous space
and, therefore, the sets in the Cartesian product V to be
real. The set of all possible events given the temporal
structure and some Cartesian product V is then
E = {(t,x) ∈ T × V } . (1)
A deduction function maps stories into the power set
P(E) and assigns to each story a set of events, called
a plot :
dE : Σ→ P(E)
s 7→ dE(s) =: s
E ⊂ E .
The deduction function depends on the underlying event
set. Some information of the story s might get lost in its
representation by events, dE(s). While in [7], dE is taken
to be a partial function, we rather map stories that are
meaningless with respect to the event set E to the empty
set.
B. Critique of the Story-Plot Framework
a. Compatibility and interoperability By interoperabil-
ity one can require different plots for different event sets
stemming from the same story to be in some sense com-
patible. Two event sets E and F encompass the same
information about a story s, if the plots dE(s) and dF (s)
can be related bijectively. If, however, F captures only a
part of the information captured by E, i.e., VE = VF ×W
→ story
FIG. 2. Observers performing one experiment see exclusively
one of the branches in the multiverse. This selection of one
branch upon measurement ensures the definiteness of the mea-
surement result.
for some set W , then for any (t,x) ∈ dF (s), there has to
exist a corresponding (t,x,y) ∈ dE(s), that is
(t,x) ∈ dF (s) ⇔ ∃y ∈W : (t,x,y) ∈ dE(s). (2)
Generally, if two event sets E and F have some “overlap,”
i.e., there exist sets WE and WF such that VE ×WE =
VF ×WF , then the compatibility condition is
∃z ∈WF : (t,x, z) ∈ dF (s) (3)
⇔ ∃y ∈ WE : (t,x,y) ∈ dE(s).
This is the compatibility constraint introduced in [7] and
demands different plots to be copies of the information
of the same corresponding story. It is possible due to
the interoperability of classical information.
b. Many worlds and distinguishability Stories allow for
multiple events happening at the same time, as illus-
trated in the following examples.
“Alice and Bob perform their respective mea-
surements.”
“Alice measures either 0 or 1.”
In the first story two a priori uncorrelated events happen
“at the same time,” by which we rather mean that we
cannot distinguish which one happened before the other.
The second story refers to multiple possible results. Both
stories have plots with at least two events
(t,x1), (t,x2) ∈ dE(s)
with the same time parameter t. While in the first story
those two events are related by AND for two indepen-
dent measurements, the latter contains events that are
connected by OR. From the plots alone, it cannot be
deduced how two events with the same time parame-
ter are related to one another. In [7], the authors al-
low for AND-connected events in stories about one single
measurement and refer to this as many worlds. This,
however, is in conflict with the definiteness of measure-
ment outcomes, in the sense that each single instance of
3a measurement gives exclusively one result. The abil-
ity to infer distinguishable, classical information from it
might be seen as the defining property of a measurement.
The distinguishability of classical information — a clas-
sical bit is either 0 or 1 — then requires, by definition,
measurement outcomes to be definite from the point of
view of a given observer. Relating two events describ-
ing results for a single measurement with AND is then a
contradiction in itself. The statement “Alice measures
0 and 1” does not describe a measurement in the above
sense, since it does not describe Alice inferring a classical
bit. In our understanding, two events in a plot of a story
about one measurement, therefore, have to be connected
by OR. Connecting such events by AND is questionable.
In a many-worlds interpretation, a tree as shown in Fig 2
is commonly used to depict the multiverse [13]. Such
a tree illustrating all possible results — i.e., the “mul-
tiverse” —, can also be constructed for collapse models.
The probability weights associated to the branches in the
different formalisms can, however, differ. Whatever the
interpretation, statements regarding actual measurement
results of an experiment refer to one particular branch of
the multiverse. Within one such branch, there are no
AND-related outcomes for a single measurement.
C. Plots and Quantum Theory
In quantum mechanics, Born’s rule relates the measure-
ment outcomes with subspaces in a sample space Ω and a
corresponding probability distribution P . By definiteness
of the outcomes we assume that Ω, in a single measure-
ment, falls into a disjoint union of at least two subsets
Ω =
⋃
k
Vk, Vk ∩ Vl = ∅ ∀ k 6= l,
where each correspond to different measurement results
and subsequently to different events. Stating disjointness
is then equivalent to saying that two results cannot occur
simultaneously, i.e.,
P (Vk ∩ Vl) = 0 ∀ k 6= l.
Consider a quantum experiment with multiple par-
ties measuring each part of a density matrix ρ
on HW1 ⊗ HW2 · · · . The overall probability distribu-
tion P (w1, w2, . . .) = Tr(ρπw1 ⊗ πw2 · · · ) encodes all
possible combinations of measurement results. Each
party that knows the entire setup and thus ρ, can
compute her own probability distribution Pk(wk) =
TrW ′(ρ 1 ⊗ πwk), where TrW ′ is the partial trace over
all other parties. The conditional probability distribu-
tion P (w1, . . . , wk−1, wk+1, . . . | wk) reflects the party’s
knowledge about the other results, given her own out-
come. She might have either used Bayes’ formula or
computed TrWk(ρ 1 ⊗ πwk) and applied Born’s rule to
the renormalized state.
All plots corresponding to a quantum experiment then
relate to the joint probability distribution and can only
contain OR-related events referring to different results of
one measurement.
S MF MW
| ↑〉|u〉
| ↓〉|d〉
|φ〉
FIG. 3. The source S emits a quantum state (e.g., a qubit)
|φ〉, which is measured by the friend in some basis (e.g., {| ↑
〉, | ↓〉}). Wigner then measures the joint system of the state
emitted by the source and the friend’s memory.
III. WIGNER’S FRIEND
The setup of the original Wigner’s-friend experiment is
depicted in Fig 3. An observer — the friend F — per-
forms a measurement MF on the quantum system emit-
ted by the source S. Both the source and the friend con-
stitute a joint quantum system which is then measured
by a superobserver — Wigner W — with a projective
measurement MW . We say, Wigner has full quantum
control over the friend’s lab.
According to textbook quantum mechanics, the friend’s
measurement induces a collapse to the eigenvector associ-
ated with the observed measurement result. To Wigner,
however, the source and the friend’s memory appear as
one big quantum system, which supposedly evolves uni-
tarily, i.e., without a collapse. If the friend’s measure-
ment does not induce a collapse, does he actually obtain
a definite measurement result? Deutsch’s variant of the
experiment [14] addresses this issue. The friend raises a
flag stating whether he observed a definite outcome or
not.
We differentiate between three models. The no-collapse
model, which can be associated with Everett’s relative-
state formalism [9], removes the collapse completely. The
objective collapse model refers to theories assuming a
collapse in every measurement. In that case, even for
Wigner the evolution of the joint system is not unitary
due to the friend’s measurement. Finally, the subjec-
tive collapse model, with each agent assuming a collapse
merely in his own measurement, is labelled as standard
quantum theory in [7]. While in the first two all agents
make consistent predictions about all measurements, the
latter allows Wigner and his friend to make predictions
that contradict each other. One further has to assume
that the friend can actually test his predictions about
Wigner’s result. The possibility of communication be-
tween encapsulated observers is questionable. In that
sense, the subjective collapse might be sufficient if the
“wrong” prediction cannot be tested.
A. Everettian Description of the Experiment
According to Everett, the friend’s measurement is an
isometry, correlating his memory state with the differ-
4ent elements of the measurement basis {|m
(i)
F 〉}i,
VF : HS → HS ⊗HF (4)
|m
(i)
F 〉 7→ |m
(i)
F 〉 ⊗ |zi〉 ∀i,
where {|zi〉}i is an orthogonal set in the memory sys-
tem recording the result. Consistently, we can model
Wigner’s measurement with an isometry [15]
VW : HS ⊗HF → HS ⊗HF ⊗HW (5)
to finally obtain the joint memory system as
ρmem = TrS
(
VW VF |ψS〉〈ψS | V
†
F V
†
W
)
,
where |ψS〉 ∈ HS is the state emitted by the source.
The density matrix ρmem encodes possible correlations
between the memory states of Wigner and his friend.
To compute it one merely needs to know the two mea-
surement bases, the one of the friend and the one of
Wigner. We assume that the source emits a superpo-
sition |ψS〉 =
1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉) , that is measured by the
friend in the basis {| ↓〉, | ↑〉} before Wigner measures
the joint system in a product basis {| ↑〉 ⊗ |u〉, | ↓〉 ⊗ |d〉}.
The corresponding density matrix
ρ(1)mem =
1
2
(|u, U〉〈u, U |+ |d,D〉〈d,D|) (6)
shows that Wigner will know the measurement result of
the friend. Alternatively, Wigner can measure in the su-
perposition basis {|φ±〉 =
√
1/2(| ↑〉 ⊗ |u〉 ± | ↓〉 ⊗ |d〉)}
resulting in memory state
ρ(2)mem =
1
2
(|u〉〈u|+ |d〉〈d|) ⊗ |+〉〈+|, (7)
where |+〉 corresponds to Wigner observing the joint sys-
tem to be in state |φ+〉. As the density matrix is a prod-
uct, Wigner cannot extract any information about the
friend’s measurement result. To incorporate a collapse
in this formalism, one replaces the source with the mea-
sured state. If the friend’s result was u, the memory state
would be
ρclpsmem = TrS
(
VW VF | ↑〉〈↑ | V
†
F V
†
W
)
(8)
= TrS
(
VW | ↑〉〈↑ | ⊗ |u〉〈u| V
†
W
)
.
If Wigner then measured in the superposition basis, he
would measure |φ−〉 with non-zero probability in case of
a collapse.
B. The Experiment in the Story-Plot Framework
The friend will account for his measurement with a plot
sF0 = {(t1, z)} (9)
containing a single event and z being the measurement
result he observed. The underlying event set is E =
{T × {0, 1}}. Wigner, on the other hand, has a plot
sW0 = {(t2, w)}, (10)
s
W
(t1, ⋆, x = 0)
(t2, ⋆, 0)
(t2, ⋆, 1)
 
s
F
(t1, ⋆, 0)
(t2, ⋆, y = 1)
(15)
(16)
FIG. 4. The contradiction in Deutsch’s version of the
Wigner’s-friend experiment: If the friend observes a defi-
nite result, he encodes this in the bit x = 0 and, therefore,
(t1, ⋆, 0) ∈ s
F . Applying the measurement update rule — the
subjective collapse — he deduces that Wigner should mea-
sure “+” or “−” with equal probability, (t2, ⋆, y = 1) ∈ s
F .
Wigner, however, deduces (t1, ⋆, x = 0) ∈ s
W from the com-
municated bit (see (15)). Assuming unitarity, he observes
|φ+〉 in the superposition measurement, i.e., (t2, ⋆, 0) ∈ s
W .
Wigner knows from the bit x that the friend obtained a def-
inite outcome, attributed a collapse and concluded also “−”
to be possible. By this retrace of F ’s conclusion together
with (16), Wigner arrives at the contradiction.
where w is the outcome Wigner observed in his measure-
ment on the combined system. Compatibility constraints
arise when Wigner and his friend deduce something from
their measurements. Generally, their plots will then be
of the form
sF = {(t0, e), (t1, z
′), (t2,yw)}, (11)
where e and yw describe what the friend can deduce
about the source and Wigner’s results. Wigner’s plot
will be
sW = {(t0, e
′), (t1,yf ), (t2, w
′)}, (12)
where e′ and yf describe his deductions. Using the same
shortened notation as in [7], compatibility would then
require that
(t1, z
′, ⋆) ∈ sF ⇔ (t1, z = z′, ⋆) ∈ sW (13)
(t2, ⋆, w = w
′) ∈ sF ⇔ (t2, ⋆, w′) ∈ sW , (14)
which means that if one party can deduce the outcome of
the other party’s measurement with certainty, this should
be what that party observes. Deductions will in the fol-
lowing be written as equalities, while observed quantities
are represented by their value.
In Deutsch’s version of the Wigner’s-friend experiment,
the friend and Wigner communicate an additional bit x,
encoding whether the friend observed a definite outcome
or not. Assume that they further have to answer the
question “Can Wigner measure |φ−〉?” encoded in an-
other bit y. This introduces further compatibility con-
straints
(t1, ⋆, x
′) ∈ sF ⇔ (t1, ⋆, x = x′) ∈ sW (15)
(t2, ⋆, y = y
′) ∈ sF ⇔ (t2, ⋆, y′) ∈ sW . (16)
The subjective-collapse model gives rise to the contradic-
tion depicted in Fig 4.
5C MF1 MA
|φC〉
S MF2 MW
|φS〉
FIG. 5. The modified extended Wigner setup.
IV. THE FRAUCHIGER/RENNER PROTOCOL
The setup introduced in [7] allows to establish contra-
dicting predictions, as for the Wigner’s-friend experiment
above, more strikingly and in a single-run. It consists
of two standard Wigner’s-friend experiments, where the
friend in the first acts as the source for the second. The
setup is given by the following protocol.
Protocol 1. The protocol assumes four parties, two
friends, F1 and F2, and two super-observers, Wigner W
and his assistant A, with full quantum control over F1
and F2 respectively. The steps of the protocol are
0. At time t0, a source emits a quantum coin in the
superposition |ψc〉 =
√
1
3 |h〉 +
√
2
3 |t〉 of head and
tail.
1. At time t1, the first friend F1 measures the coin
and prepares a spin state |φs〉 = | ↓〉 if the re-
sult of the measurement was head and a spin state
|φs〉 =
√
1
2 (| ↓〉 + | ↑〉) if the result was tail. The
measurement is given by an isometry correlating
the brain state |φF1〉 ∈ {|H〉, |T 〉} of F1 with the
different coin states.
2. At time t2, the second friend F2 measures the spin
state in the basis {| ↑〉, | ↓〉}. The measurement is
given by an isometry correlating the brain state
|φF2〉 ∈ {|U〉, |D〉} of F2 with the different spin
states.
3. At time t3, the assistant Ameasures the coin C and
the brain state of F1 in a basis
{
|o〉 =
√
1/2(|h,H〉 − |t, T 〉),
|f〉 =
√
1/2(|h,H〉+ |t, T 〉)
}
.
4. At time t4, Wigner W measures the spin state S
and the brain state of F2 in a basis
{
|O〉 =
√
1/2(| ↓, D〉 − | ↑, U〉),
|F 〉 =
√
1/2(| ↓, D〉+ | ↑, U〉)
}
.
5. At time t5, Wigner and his assistant compare their
results. If they both obtain the measurement result
ok corresponding to |O〉 and |o〉 respectively, they
halt, otherwise the restart with the first step.
V. DISCUSSION OF THE
SUBJECTIVE-COLLAPSE MODEL
We will now consider the predictions of the various agents
about the other’s measurement result in the halting
round of the protocol. The calculations are performed
in the Everett formalism described above. The subscript
on the probabilities indicates whether a collapse was con-
sidered, Pclps, or not, Pism.
c. A about F2 The knowledge of A about F2 is given
by the distribution
Pism(f2 | a) =
1/NaTr
[
V |φC〉〈φC |V
† · |f2〉〈f2| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗ 1rest
]
where V = VA · VF1 · VF2 with the values
f2 Pism(f2 | f) Pism(f2 | o)
u 0.2 1.0
d 0.8 0.0
(17)
Thus, A can conclude that F2 measures ↑ upon obtain-
ing o.
d. F2 about F1 The knowledge of F2 about F1 is given
by the distribution
Pism(f1 | f2) = 1/Nf2 · Tr
[
V |φC〉〈φC |V
† ·
|f1〉〈f1| ⊗ |f2〉〈f2| ⊗ 1rest
]
where V = VF1 · VF2 with the values
f1 Pism(f1 | U) Pism(f1 | D)
h 0.0 0.5
t 1.0 0.5
(18)
Then F2 can conclude that F1 measures t upon measur-
ing ↑.
e. F1 about W (collapse) If F1 assumes a collapse to
happen after his measurement he can calculate the con-
ditional probability over W ’s result as follows.
Pclps(w | f1) = 1/Nf1 · Tr
[
V |f1〉〈f1|V
† ·
1rest ⊗ |w〉〈w|
]
where V = VW ·VA ·VF2 ·VF1 . This yields the distribution
w Pclps(w | H) Pclps(w | T )
F 0.5 1.0
O 0.5 0.0
(19)
So upon measuring T , F1 can conclude that W mea-
sured F .
f. F1 about W (no collapse) The distribution turns
out to be
Pism(w | f1) = 1/Nf1 · Tr
[
V |φC〉〈φC |V
† ·
|f1〉〈f1| ⊗ |w〉〈w| ⊗ 1rest
]
6in final round: both measure ok
W
measures O
A
PF2|A(f2 | o) = δ↑,f2
F2
PF1|F2(f1 |↑) = δt,f1
F1
P
clps
W |F1
(w | t) = δF,w
 
comm.sW
(t4, ⋆, ⋆,O)
(t3, ⋆, x = o, ⋆)
(t4, ⋆, ⋆,F )
 
s
A
(t3, ⋆, ⋆, o)
(t2, ⋆, z =↑, ⋆)
s
F2
(t2, ⋆, ⋆, ↑)
(t1, r = T, ⋆, ⋆)
s
F1
(t4, ⋆, ⋆, w = F )
(t1, t, ⋆, ⋆)
1
FIG. 6. Structure of the contradiction for the setup in [7]: Each party deduces, based on their own result, the measurement
outcome of another party with certainty (dotted arrows). Compatibility constraints then require this deduction to equal the
observation of the respective party (solid arrows). The deduction (1) of F1 is, however, a result of the subjective-collapse model.
with values
w Pism(w | H) Pism(w | T )
F 0.83333 0.83333
O 0.16667 0.16667
(20)
if there is no collapse. Hence F1 cannot deduce W ’s
measurement with certainty. The contradiction arises
from F1’s prediction about W ’s result in the halting
round as shown in the Fig 6. This prediction is a re-
sult of F1 attributing a collapse to his measurement and
hence due to the subjective-collapse model. In the halt-
ing round, if W actually measured O, and F1 claimed
he should have obtained another result, the model F1
used to derive the very claim is falsified. In general, the
subjective-collapse model does not give consistent predic-
tions for a setup containing encapsulated observers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this note we critically review a recent result [7] by
Frauchiger and Renner questioning the logical consis-
tency of single-world interpretations of quantum theory.
In fact, the authors of [7] prove an inconsistency of the
subjective-collapse framework. It shows that collapse
and unitary evolution cannot be reconciled. This is the
core of the “big” measurement problem [16] as illustrated
in the original Wigner’s-friend experiment. The contra-
diction in the latter is based on the possibility of ad-
ditional measurement results, and can thus merely be
tested in a statistical analysis of multiple runs. In the
Frauchiger/Renner protocol, however, two parties make
opposing predictions for a single measurement result
(once the halting condition is met): Their protocol makes
the conflict more striking and evident.
The contradiction cannot be resolved with the notion of
“many worlds” established in [7] without abandoning the
definiteness of the measurement result. This, in turn,
would be to say one does not infer distinguishable infor-
mation from a measurement. We consider AND-related
statements about results of a single measurement for a
given observer debatable, regardless of the interpretation
of quantum theory. For instance, Everett’s formalism
does not imply multiple “coexisting” results in the sense
above. One of the branches in common many-worlds in-
terpretation has to be singled out if measurement results
are to be definite (see Fig 2). An observer merely holds
his memory system, and the respective density matrix
is obtained by partial trace over the source. This yields
a statistical mixture of memory states corresponding to
definite outcomes instead of the pure state as claimed,
for example, in [17]. This point is connected to Maudlin’s
taking an external standpoint of a superobserver, view-
ing the wave function from the outside. For any specific
(internal) observer, measurement results keep being def-
inite. In this sense, definiteness of outcomes can be in-
corporated into the relative-state formalism and is not
necessarily equivalent to an objective collapse. Subjec-
tively, a measurement looks like a collapse as an observer
cannot “watch” himself performing the observation —
and thus cannot “see” the unitary evolution entangling
him with the observed system [18].
The formal description of the subjective collapse leads
to contradicting predictions for Wigner’s-friend experi-
ments. The conflict becomes manifest only if encapsu-
lated observers can communicate — i.e., if the friend and
Wigner can test their predictions against actual observa-
tions. It has been questioned whether this is in principle
possible.
The Wigner’s-friend experiment can (in principle) dis-
criminate between two competing quantum formalisms
describing a measurement — the unitary relative-state
formalism and the non-unitary measurement update rule.
A specific combination of these two formalisms, together
with the assumption regarding possible communication,
gives a contradiction. We do, however, not regard a for-
malism to necessarily imply a particular interpretation
like “many worlds” or “collapse.” We believe that the
contradiction above does, therefore, not disqualify a par-
ticular interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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